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U $    UKIS,.Convention   on_Combating_ԀBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactions       Preamble N  WTheParties,   Consideringthatbriberyisawidespreadphenomenon S"" ininternationalbusinesstransactions,includingtradeandinvestment,whichraisesseriousmoralandpoliticalconcerns,underminesgoodgovernanceandeconomicdevelopment,anddistortsinternationalcompetitiveconditions;Consideringthatallcountriessharearesponsibility C'# tocombatbriberyininternationalbusinesstransactions;HavingregardtotheRevisedRecommendationon *%! _Combating_ԀBriberyinInternationalBusinessTransactions,adoptedbytheCounciloftheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentϐ(OECD)on23May1997,C(97)123/FINAL,which,interalia,calledforeffectivemeasurestodeter,preventandcombatthebriberyofforeignpublicofficialsinconnectionwithinternationalbusinesstransactions,inparticulartheprompt_criminalisation_ԀofsuchbriberyinaneffectiveandcoordinatedmannerandinconformitywiththeagreedcommonelementssetoutinthatRecommendationandwiththejurisdictionalandotherbasiclegalprinciplesofeachcountry;Welcomingotherrecentdevelopmentswhichfurther    advanceinternationalunderstandingandcooperationin_combating_Ԁbriberyofpublicofficials,includingactionsoftheUnitedNations,theWorldBank,theInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldTradeOrganisation,theOrganisationofAmericanStates,theCouncilofEuropeandtheEuropeanUnion;    Welcomingtheeffortsofcompanies,businessorgani a0 sationsandtradeunionsaswellasothernongovernmentalorganisationstocombatbribery;    &  Recognisingtheroleofgovernmentsintheprevention 5 ofsolicitationofbribesfromindividualsandenterprisesininternationalbusinesstransactions;  '5  Recognisingthatachievingprogressinthisfieldre   quiresnotonlyeffortsonanationallevelbutalsomultilateralcooperation,monitoringandfollowup;    Recognisingthatachievingequivalenceamongthe # measurestobetakenbythePartiesisanessentialobjectandpurposeoftheConvention,whichrequiresthattheConventionberatifiedwithoutderogationsaffectingthisequivalence;    Haveagreedasfollows: !)   Article1TheOffenceofBriberyofForeignPublicOfficials 9#,   1.EachPartyshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoestablishthatitisacriminaloffenceunderitslawforanypersonintentionallytooffer,promiseorgiveanyunduepecuniaryorotheradvantage,whetherdirectlyorthroughintermediaries,toaforeignpublicofficial,forthatofficialorforathirdparty,inorderthattheofficialactorrefrainfromactinginrelationtotheperformanceofofficialduties,inordertoobtainorretainbusinessorotherimproper E*&6 advantageintheconductofinternationalbusiness.  2.EachPartyshalltakeanymeasuresnecessarytoestablishthatcomplicityin,includingincitement,aidingandabetting,orauthorisationofanactofbriberyofaforeignpublicofficialshallbeacriminaloffence.AttemptandconspiracytobribeaforeignpublicofficialshallbecriminaloffencestothesameextentasattemptandconspiracytobribeapublicofficialofthatParty.Z+u +l2E? +l2Z  3.Theoffencessetoutinparagraphs1and2abovearehereinafterreferredtoas briberyofaforeignpublicofficial.  4.ForthepurposeofthisConvention:L !!L (@   (@zz$2  a  .3  Ԉ0 E   foreignpublicofficialmeansanypersonholding q@  alegislative,administrativeorjudicialofficeofaforeigncountry,whetherappointedorelected;anypersonexercisingapublicfunctionforaforeigncountry,includingforapublicagencyorpublicenterprise;andanyofficialoragentofapublicinternationalorganisation;(@݌ EE Ќ   (@   (@@rr$2  b  .3  Ԉ0 E   foreigncountryincludesalllevelsandsubdivi  sionsofgovernment,fromnationaltolocal;(@@k݌ EE Ќ   (@   (@~~$2  c  .3  Ԉ0 E   actorrefrainfromactinginrelationtotheper - formanceofofficialdutiesincludesanyuseofthepublicofficial'sposition,whetherornotwithintheofficial'sauthorisedcompetence.(@݌ EE Ќ  hh  Article2   ResponsibilityofLegalPersons e4! O  EachPartyshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessary,inaccordancewithitslegalprinciples,toestablishtheliabilityoflegalpersonsforthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficial.  Article3Sanctions U $(   1.Thebriberyofaforeignpublicofficialshallbepunishablebyeffective,proportionateanddissuasivecriminalpenalties.TherangeofpenaltiesshallbecomparabletothatapplicabletothebriberyoftheParty'sownpublicofficialsandshall,inthecaseofnaturalpersons,includedeprivationoflibertysufficienttoenableeffectivemutuallegalassistanceandextradition.  2.Intheeventthat,underthelegalsystemofaParty,criminalresponsibilityisnotapplicabletolegalpersons,thatPartyshallensurethatlegalpersonsshallbesubjecttoeffective,proportionateanddissuasivenoncriminalsanctions,includingmonetarysanctions,forbriberyofforeignpublicofficials. 1*&6   3.EachPartyshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoprovidethatthebribeandtheproceedsofthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficial,orpropertythevalueofwhichcorrespondstothatofsuchproceeds,aresubjecttoseizureandconfiscationorthatmonetarysanctionsofcomparableeffectareapplicable.  4.EachPartyshallconsidertheimpositionofadditionalciviloradministrativesanctionsuponapersonsubjecttosanctionsforthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficial.ii  Article4Jurisdiction U $    1.EachPartyshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoestablishitsjurisdictionoverthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficialwhentheoffenceiscommittedinwholeorinpartinitsterritory.  2.EachPartywhichhasjurisdictiontoprosecuteitsnationalsforoffencescommittedabroadshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoestablishitsjurisdiction& h todosoinrespectofthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficial,accordingtothesameprinciples.'h  3.WhenmorethanonePartyhasjurisdictionoveranallegedoffencedescribedinthisConvention,thePartiesinvolvedshall,attherequestofoneofthem,consultwithaviewtodeterminingthemostappropriatejurisdictionforprosecution.  4.EachPartyshallreviewwhetheritscurrentbasisforjurisdictioniseffectiveinthefightagainstthebriberyofforeignpublicofficialsand,ifitisnot,shalltakeremedialsteps.  Article5Enforcement 9% &  InvestigationandprosecutionofthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficialshallbesubjecttotheapplicablerulesandprinciplesofeachParty.Theyshallnotbeinfluencedbyconsiderationsofnationaleconomicinterest,thepotentialeffectuponrelationswithanotherState& h Ԁortheidentityofthenaturalorlegalpersonsinvolved.'hu"  Article6StatuteofLimitations E%!/   Anystatuteoflimitationsapplicabletotheoffenceofbriberyofaforeignpublicofficialshallallowanadequateperiodoftimefortheinvestigationandprosecutionofthisoffence.  ($4   q&    qArticle7 1 MoneyLaundering  5  EachPartywhichhaq' 1Fqsmadebriberyofitsownpublicofficialapredicateoffenceforthepurposeoftheapplicationofitsmoneylaunderinglegislationshalldosoonthesametermsforthebriberyofaforeignpublicofficial,withoutregardtotheplacewherethebriberyoccurred.  Article8Accounting =     1.Inordertocombatbriberyofforeignpublicofficialseffectively,eachPartyshalltakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessary,withintheframeworkofitslawsandregulationsregardingthemaintenanceofbooksandrecords,financialstatementdisclosures,andaccountingandauditingstandards,toprohibittheestablishmentofoffthebooksaccounts,themakingofoffthebooksorinadequatelyidentifiedtransactions,therecordingofnonexistentexpenditures,theentryofliabilitieswithincorrectidentificationoftheirobject,aswellastheuseoffalsedocuments,bycompaniessubjecttothoselawsandregulations,forthepurposeofbribingforeignpublicofficialsorofhidingsuchbribery.  2.EachPartyshallprovideeffective,proportionateanddissuasivecivil,administrativeorcriminalpenaltiesforsuchomissionsandfalsificationsinrespectofthebooks,records,accountsandfinancialstatementsofsuchcompanies.  Article9MutualLegalAssistance   *  1.EachPartyshall,tothefullestextentpossibleunderitslawsandrelevanttreatiesandarrangements,providepromptandeffectivelegalassistancetoanotherPartyforthepurposeofcriminalinvestigationsandproceedingsbroughtbyaPartyconcerningoffenceswithinthescopeofthisConventionandfornoncriminalproceedingswithinthescopeofthisConventionbroughtbyaPartyagainstalegalperson.TherequestedPartyshallinformtherequestingParty,withoutdelay,ofanyadditionalinformationordocumentsneededtosupporttherequestforassistanceand,whererequested,ofthestatusandoutcomeoftherequestforassistance.  2.WhereaPartymakesmutuallegalassistanceconditionalupontheexistenceofdualcriminality,dualcriminalityshallbedeemedtoexistiftheoffenceforwhichtheassistanceissoughtiswithinthescopeofthisConvention.  3.APartyshallnotdeclinetorendermutuallegalassistanceforcriminalmatterswithinthescopeofthisConventiononthegroundofbanksecrecy. 5*&6 Ї  Article10Extradition    1.BriberyofaforeignpublicofficialshallbedeemedtobeincludedasanextraditableoffenceunderthelawsofthePartiesandtheextraditiontreatiesbetweenthem.  2.IfaPartywhichmakesextraditionconditionalontheexistenceofanextraditiontreatyreceivesarequestforextraditionfromanotherPartywithwhichithasnoextraditiontreaty,itmayconsiderthisConventiontobethelegalbasisforextraditioninrespectoftheoffenceofbriberyofaforeignpublicofficial.  3.EachPartyshalltakeanymeasuresnecessarytoassureeitherthatitcanextraditeitsnationalsorthatitcanprosecuteitsnationalsfortheoffenceofbriberyofaforeignpublicofficial.APartywhichdeclinesarequesttoextraditeapersonforbriberyofaforeignpublicofficialsolelyonthegroundthatthepersonisitsnationalshallsubmitthecasetoitscompetentauthoritiesforthepurposeofprosecution.  4.ExtraditionforbriberyofaforeignpublicofficialissubjecttotheconditionssetoutinthedomesticlawandapplicabletreatiesandarrangementsofeachParty.WhereaPartymakesextraditionconditionalupontheexistenceofdualcriminality,thatconditionshallbedeemedtobefulfillediftheoffenceforwhichextraditionissoughtiswithinthescopeofArticle1ofthisConvention.  Article11ResponsibleAuthorities     ForthepurposesofArticle4,paragraph3,onconsultation,Article9,onmutuallegalassistanceandArticle10,onextradition,eachPartyshallnotifytotheSecretaryGeneraloftheOECDanauthorityorauthoritiesresponsibleformakingandreceivingrequests,&  ԀwhichshallserveaschannelofcommunicationforthesemattersforthatParty,withoutprejudicetootherarrangementsbetweenParties.'  Article12MonitoringandFollowup u"D+   ThePartiesshallcooperateincarryingoutaprogrammeofsystematicfollowuptomonitorandpromotethefullimplementationofthisConvention.UnlessotherwisedecidedbyconsensusoftheParties,thisshallbedoneintheframeworkoftheOECDWorkingGrouponBriberyinInternationalBusinessTransactionsandaccordingtoitstermsofreference,orwithintheframeworkandtermsofreferenceofanysuccessortoitsfunctions,andPartiesshallbearthecostsoftheprogrammeinaccordancewiththerulesapplicabletothatbody. 5*&6 Ї  Article13SignatureandAccession  P  1.Untilitsentryintoforce,thisConventionshallbeopenforsignaturebyOECDmembersandbynonmemberswhichhavebeeninvitedtobecomefullparticipantsinitsWorkingGrouponBriberyinInternationalBusinessTransactions.  2.Subsequenttoitsentryintoforce,thisConventionshallbeopentoaccessionbyanynonsignatorywhichisamemberoftheOECDorhasbecomeafullparticipantintheWorkingGrouponBriberyinInternationalBusinessTransactionsoranysuccessortoitsfunctions.Foreachsuchnonsignatory,theConven& h tionshallenterintoforceonthesixtiethdayfollowingthedateofdepositofitsinstrumentofaccession.'h   Article14RatificationandDepositary `  |  1.ThisConventionissubjecttoacceptance,approvalorratificationbytheSignatories,inaccordancewiththeirrespectivelaws.  2.Instrumentsofacceptance,approval,ratificationoraccessionshallbedepositedwiththeSecretaryGeneraloftheOECD,whoshallserveasDepositaryofthisConvention.  Article15EntryintoForce l )  1.ThisConventionshallenterintoforceonthesixtiethdayfollowingthedateuponwhichfiveofthetencountrieswhichhavethetenlargestexportshares(seeannex),andwhichrepresentbythemselvesatleastsixtypercentofthecombinedtotalexportsofthosetencountries,havedepositedtheirinstrumentsofacceptance,approval,orratification.Foreachsignatorydepositingitsinstrumentaftersuchentryintoforce,theConventionshallenterintoforceonthesixtiethdayafterdepositofitsinstrument.  2.If,after31December1998,theConventionhasnotenteredintoforceunderparagraph1above,anysignatorywhichhasdepositeditsinstrumentofacceptance,approvalorratificationmaydeclareinwritingtotheDepositaryitsreadinesstoacceptentryintoforceofthisConventionunderthisparagraph2.TheConventionshallenterintoforceforsuchasignatoryonthesixtiethdayfollowingthedateuponwhichsuchdeclarationshavebeendepositedbyatleasttwosignatories.Foreachsignatorydepositingitsdeclarationaftersuchentryintoforce,theConventionshallenterintoforceonthesixtiethdayfollowingthedateofdeposit. 5*&6   Article16Amendment  T  AnyPartymayproposetheamendmentofthisConvention.AproposedamendmentshallbesubmittedtotheDepositarywhichshallcommunicateittotheotherPartiesatleastsixtydaysbeforeconveningameetingofthePartiestoconsidertheproposedamendment.AnamendmentadoptedbyconsensusoftheParties,orbysuchothermeansasthePartiesmaydeterminebyconsensus,shallenterintoforcesixtydaysafterthedepositofaninstrumentofratification,acceptanceorapprovalbyalloftheParties,orinsuchothercircumstancesasmaybespecifiedbythePartiesatthetimeofadoptionoftheamendment.  Article17Withdrawal )    APartymaywithdrawfromthisConventionbysubmittingwrittennotificationtotheDepositary.Suchwithdrawalshallbeeffectiveoneyearafterthedateofthereceiptofthenotification.Afterwithdrawal,cooperationshallcontinuebetweenthePartiesandthePartywhichhaswithdrawnonallrequestsforassistanceorextraditionmadebeforetheeffectivedateofwithdrawalwhichremainpending.  5   Annex 1 STATISTICSONOECDEXPORTS   /*"/.# d  d 00/ss, , 8/, 0, 0+  3) M 3StatisticsonOECDExports R.E*Y("   R ;..,!". ;1990!1996US$million ;..,!\ ".. ;1990!1996%oftotalOECD >../!\ ".. >1990!1996%oftotal10 K.>,\"  ..  KЀUnitedStates 2..#Y (. 2287118 ]..N!Y (U.. /@15,9/@]15.9 ..sCY (U /@15,9 /@.. 333333@19,7333333@19.7 m.`NY (U 333333@19,7  333333@..  mЀGermany 2..#% . 2254746 ]..N!% U.. 333333,@14,1333333,@]14.1 ..sC% U 333333,@14,1 333333,@.. 1@17,51@17.5 m.`N% U 1@17,5  1@..  mЀJapan 2..# . 2212665 ]..N! U.. '@11,8'@]11.8 ..sC U '@11,8 '@.. 333333-@14,6333333-@14.6 m.`N U 333333-@14,6  333333-@..  mЀFrance 2..# . 2138471 \..M! U.. @7,7@\7.7 ..qB U @7,7 @.. #@9,5#@9.5 l._M U #@9,5  #@..  lЀUnited̀Kingdom 2..#= !. 2Ј121258 \..M!= #U.. @6,7@\Ј6.7 ..qB= %U @6,7 @..  @8,3 @Ј8.3 l._M= 'U  @8,3   @..  lЀItaly 2..#  (. 2112449 \..M!  )U.. @6,2@\6.2 ..qB  *U @6,2 @.. @7,7@7.7 l._M  +U @7,7  @..  lЀCanada 2..# ,. 291215 \..M! -U.. ffffff@5,1ffffff@\5.1 ..qB .U ffffff@5,1 ffffff@.. 333333@6,3333333@6.3 l._M /U 333333@6,3  333333@..  lЀKorea(1) 2..#p 0. 281364 \..M!p 1U.. @4,5@\4.5 ..qBp 2U @4,5 @.. ffffff@5,6ffffff@5.6 l._Mp 3U ffffff@5,6  ffffff@..  lЀNetherlands 2..#m< 4. 281264 \..M!m< 5U.. @4,5@\4.5 ..qBm< 6U @4,5 @.. ffffff@5,6ffffff@5.6 l._Mm< 7U ffffff@5,6  ffffff@..  lЀBelgium̀Luxembourg 2..# 9. 2Ј78598 \..M! ;U.. @4,4@\Ј4.4 ..qB =U @4,4 @.. @5,4@Ј5.4 u.hM ?U @5,4  @..  ùTotal10 ;..,!m<A. ;Ј1459148 ]..N!m<CU.. @T@81,0@T@]Ј81.0 ..rCm<EU @T@81,0 @T@.. Y@100Y@Ј100 l._Mm<GU Y@100  Y@..  lЀSpain 2..#9H. 242469 \..M!9IU.. 333333@2,4333333@\2.4 _..PB9JU 333333@2,4 333333@.. _Ј K.>,9KU  ..  KЀSwitzerland 2..#L. 240395 \..M!MU.. @2,2@\2.2 _..PBNU @2,2 @.. _Ј K.>,OU  ..  KЀSweden 2..#P. 236710 \..M!QU.. @2,0@\2.0 _..PBRU @2,0 @.. _Ј K.>,SU  ..  KЀMexico(1) 2..#lT. 234233 \..M!lUU.. ffffff?1,9ffffff?\1.9 _..PBlVU ffffff?1,9 ffffff?.. _Ј K.>,lWU  ..  KЀAustralia 2..#i8X. 227194 \..M!i8YU.. ?1,5?\1.5 _..PBi8ZU ?1,5 ?.. _Ј K.>,i8[U  ..  KЀDenmark 2..#5\. 224145 \..M!5]U.. ?1,3?\1.3 _..PB5^U ?1,3 ?.. _Ј K.>,5_U  ..  KЀAustria* 2..#`. 222432 \..M!aU.. 333333?1,2333333?\1.2 _..PBbU 333333?1,2 333333?.. _Ј K.>,cU  ..  KЀNorway 2..#d. 221666 \..M!eU.. 333333?1,2333333?\1.2 _..PBfU 333333?1,2 333333?.. _Ј K.>,gU  ..  KЀIreland 2..#hh. 219217 \..M!hiU.. ?1,1?\1.1 _..PBhjU ?1,1 ?.. _Ј K.>,hkU  ..  KЀFinland 2..#e4l. 217296 \..M!e4mU.. ?1,0?\1.0 _..PBe4nU ?1,0 ?.. _Ј K.>,e4oU  ..  KЀPoland(1)** 2..#1p. 212652 \..M!1qU.. ffffff?0,7ffffff?\0.7 _..PB1rU ffffff?0,7 ffffff?.. _Ј K.>,1sU  ..  KЀPortugal 2..#t. 210801 \..M!uU.. 333333?0,6333333?\0.6 _..PBvU 333333?0,6 333333?.. _Ј K.>,wU  ..  KЀTurkey* 2..#x. 28027 \..M!yU.. ?0,4?\0.4 _..PBzU ?0,4 ?.. _Ј K.>,{U  ..  K̀Hungary** 2..#I}. 2Ј6795 \..M!IU.. ?0,4?\Ј0.4 _..PBIU ?0,4 ?.. _Ј K.>,dU  ..  KЀNewZealand 2..# . 26663 \..M! U.. ?0,4?\0.4 _..PB U ?0,4 ?.. _Ј K.>, U  ..  KЀCzechRèpublic*** 2..#!d. 2Ј6263 \..M!!dU.. 333333?0,3333333?\Ј0.3 _..PB!dU 333333?0,3 333333?.. _Ј K.>, U  ..  KЀGreece* 2..#a"0. 24606 \..M!a"0U.. 333333?0,3333333?\0.3 _..PBa"0U 333333?0,3 333333?.. _Ј K.>,a"0U  ..  KЀIceland S..D-#. @949@S949 }..nB-#U @949 @.. ?0,1?}0.1 _..PB-#U ?0,1 ?.. _Ј T.G,-#U  ..   T̀TotalOECD >../!$|  . >Ј1801661 _..P!$| U.. Y@100Y@_Ј100 _..PB$| U Y@100 Y@..  _Ј<20#U    .. <Notes:*1990!1995;**1991!1996;***1993!1996Source:OECD,(1)IMF 'X#   A($ &   ConcerningBelgiumLuxembourg:TradestatisticsforBelgiumandLuxembourgareavailableonlyonacombinedbasisforthetwocountries.ForpurposesofArticle15,paragraph1oftheConvention,ifeitherBelgiumorLuxembourgdepositsitsinstrumentofacceptance,approvalorratification,orifbothBelgiumandLuxembourgdeposittheirinstrumentsofacceptance,approvalorratification,itshallbeconsideredthatoneofthecountrieswhichhavethetenlargestexportsshareshasdepositeditsinstrumentandthejointexportsofbothcountrieswillbecountedtowardsthe60percentofcombinedtotalexportsofthosetencountries,whichisrequiredforentryintoforceunderthisprovision.' 1'