

Umsögn um mál 70, 150. löggjafarþing, þingskjal 70 –  
um undirritun og fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum

Vestmannaeyjum, 26. desember 2019,

Alda, félag um sjálfbærni og lýðræði, ítrekar hér með fyrri umsögn sína um sama þingmál sem lagt var fram á 149. þingi.

Alda lýsir yfir eindregnum stuðningi við að þingsályktunartillaga þessi verði samþykkt hið fyrsta, og enn fremur að Ísland gerist aðili að samningi Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum. Kjarnorkuvopn eru mikil hættu fyrir mannkynið og lífið á jörðinni, og í því ljósi mikilvægt að hætt verði framleiðslu, þróun og varðveislu slíkra vopna, sem samningurinn miðar að. Ísland á ekki að vera eftirbátur í því að auka stöðugleika og frið í heiminum, en í því ljósi ætti að samþykkja þessa þingsályktun hið fyrsta.

Félagið leggur áherslu á að engin ástæða er til að tefja frekar samþykkt þingsályktunartillögu þessarar, enda eru umsagnaraðilar allir á einu máli og nauðsynin til að hefta notkun og útbreiðslu kjarnorkuvopna ærin.

Fyrir hönd stjórnar Öldu,  
Guðmundur D. Haraldsson, stjórnarmaður



Alþýðusamband Íslands

Utanríkismálanefnd Alþingis  
Alþingi  
150 Reykjavík

Reykjavík, 11.12.2019  
Tilvísun: 201912-00012

**Efni: Umsögn um tillögu til þingsályktunar um undirritun og fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum, 70. mál.**

Alþýðusamband Íslands styður markmið þingsályktunartillögunnar að fela ríkisstjórninni fyrir Íslands hönd að undirrita og fullgilda samning um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum sem samþykktur var á ráðstefnu Sameinuðu þjóðanna árið 2017.

Alþýðusambandið á aðild að ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation) sem hratt af stað herferð árið 2017 til að hvetja til afvopnunar og fullgildingar samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna. ITUC bendir á að fyrir 1% af útgjöldum heimsins til hernaðarmála er hægt að fæða vannærða heimsbúa í fimm ár. Engu að síður hefur vígbúnaður aukist í stað þess að leggja áherslu á félagslegar varnir og uppbyggingu heilbrigðs vinnumarkaðar.

Drífa Snædal  
Forseti ASÍ

**AMNESTY  
INTERNATIONAL**



Utanríkisráðgjafi Alþingis,  
Alþingi, nefndasvið  
Austurstræti 8-10  
150 Reykjavík

Reykjavík 14.1.2020

**Efni: Umsögn Íslandsdeildar Amnesty International um tillögu til þingsályktunar um undirritun og fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum, 150. löggjafarþing 2019-2020. Þskj. 70-70. mál.**

Amnesty International tók á heimsþingi samtakanna árið 2003 ákvörðun um að andmæla notkun, vörslu, framleiðslu og flutningi á kjarnorkuvopnum.

Samtökin hafa mótmælt notkun allra handahófskenndra vopna, svo sem jarðsprengja og klasaprengja. Kjarnorkuvopn falla undir þá skilgreiningu en slík vopn þyrma engum sem fyrir þeim eða geislum frá þeim verður.

Kjarnorkuvopn eru skaðlegustu, ómannúðlegustu og handahófskenndustu vopn sem smíðuð hafa verið. Bæði umfang þeirrar eyðileggingar sem þau valda strax við sprengingu og sú hætta sem stafar af geislavirku ofanfalli sem hefði varanleg og erfðafræðilega eyðileggjandi áhrif, myndu valda borgurum ólíðandi skaða. Í ljósi þess að kjarnorkuvopn hefðu víðfeðm áhrif og skelfilegar afleiðingar fyrir menn og umhverfi er það á ábyrgð stjórnvalda að eyða allri slíkri hættu í samræmi við skyldur þeirra gagnvart mannúðarlögum.

Íslandsdeild Amnesty International fagnar tillögu til þingsályktunar um að Ísland undirriti og fullgildi samning Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum og vonar að hún verði samþykkt hið fyrsta. Þetta er sögulegur samningur sem öll lönd ættu að styðja til fulls og koma þannig í veg fyrir frekari þróun, vörslu og notkun kjarnavopna. Undirritun og fullgilding samningsins færir okkur skrefi nær heimi sem er laus við hrylling kjarnorkuvopna.

Virðingarfyllt,

*Birna Guðmundsdóttir*

Birna Guðmundsdóttir

Lögfræðilegur ráðgjafi

Íslandsdeildar Amnesty International



Nefndasvið Alþingis  
Utanríkismálanefnd  
Austurstræti 8-10  
150 Reykjavík

Reykjavík 10. janúar 2020

Meðfylgjandi er umsögn Barnaheilla - Save the Children á Íslandi um tillögu til þingsályktunar um undirritun og fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum. Þingskjal 70 – 70. mál.

Virðingarfyllt,  
f.h. Barnaheilla - Save the Children á Íslandi

Erna Reynisdóttir,  
framkvæmdastjóri

**Umsögn Barnaheilla – Save the Children á Íslandi um tillögu til þingsályktunar um samning Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum.**

Barnaheill hafa fengið ofangreint mál til umsagnar og þakka fyrir það.

Samtökin styðja við tillöguna og minna á skyldu ríkisins til að taka þátt í alþjóðasamvinnu til að vernda börn og aðra almenna borgara fyrir vopnaátökum, sbr. sáttmála hinna Sameinuðu þjóða og sem m.a. leiðir af 4. mgr. 38. gr. Barnasáttmálans, sbr. lög nr. 19/2013: Í samræmi við skyldur sínar samkvæmt alþjóðlegum mannúðarreglum til að vernda óbreytta borgara í vopnaátökum skulu aðildarríki gera allar raunhæfar ráðstafanir til að tryggja börnum, sem áhrif vopnaátaka ná til, vernd og umönnun.

Jafnframt vísa Barnaheill til Heimsmarkmiða Sameinuðu þjóðanna, sbr. nr. 16 um frið og réttlæti og 17 um samvinnu um markmiðin.

Barnaheill vinna að bættum mannréttindum barna og hafa Barnasáttmálann að leiðarljósi í öllu sínu starfi.

# ICAN submission to Alþingi inquiry into resolution 70/150, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum”

## Introduction

1. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) is pleased to make the following submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Icelandic parliament (Alþingi) in support of resolution 70/150, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum” (“Prohibition of nuclear weapons”).
2. ICAN is a campaign coalition consisting of more than 540 non-governmental organizations in 100 countries, including Iceland, with the aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. We were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for our efforts “to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and our “ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons”.

## Context

3. On 7 July 2017, 122 nations voted to adopt a landmark global agreement to outlaw nuclear weapons, known as the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). It opened for signature on 20 September 2017 and will enter into legal force once 50 nations have ratified or acceded to it. As of 13 January 2020, 80 states have signed the TPNW and 34 have ratified. Prior to the adoption of the TPNW, nuclear weapons were the only weapons of mass destruction not subject to an explicit ban under international law.
4. The TPNW prohibits states from developing, testing, producing, possessing, hosting, transferring, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. It also forbids them from assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in any of these illegal activities. A state with nuclear weapons may join the treaty, so long as it agrees to destroy them in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan. Similarly, a state that hosts another state’s nuclear weapons on its territory may join, so long as it agrees to remove them by a deadline to be set by the TPNW’s First Meeting of States Parties.

## **Why Iceland should join**

5. Nuclear weapons threaten every nation's security and would cause catastrophic humanitarian consequences if they are ever used again. The impact on civilians and the environment would be devastating. The ongoing nuclear modernization programmes of nuclear-armed states and the inflammatory rhetoric of certain leaders, combined with offensive cyber operations, all increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, either by accident or intent. This would seriously endanger Iceland and the world.
6. It is vital that states committed to nuclear disarmament and a rules-based world order work to strengthen the nuclear taboo by joining the TPNW. Nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose. The TPNW offers the best hope of ending decades of deadlock in disarmament and moving the world towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
7. Iceland has joined international treaties banning biological weapons, chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, and cluster munitions based on the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of these weapons on civilians. As a responsible member of the international community, Iceland should now join the UN treaty banning the worst weapons of all: nuclear weapons.
8. Iceland has a proud history of support for nuclear disarmament. On five occasions from 2012 to 2015, Iceland co-sponsored joint diplomatic statements asserting that nuclear weapons should "never be used again, under any circumstances". By becoming a party to the TPNW, Iceland would make this injunction a matter of international law, rejecting any role for weapons of mass destruction in international affairs.

## **Alliance policy**

9. There is nothing in the TPNW that prevents Iceland from maintaining a military alliance with a nuclear-armed state. (Indeed, a number of states in alliances with the United States have already signed and ratified the TPNW.) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's legal foundation, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, does not mention nuclear weapons. NATO members are not legally bound to endorse the policy of "extended nuclear deterrence".
10. While NATO's first strategic concepts did not mention nuclear weapons at all, the current strategic concept, finalised in 2010, commits NATO "to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance". The purpose of the TPNW is precisely to "create the conditions" for a nuclear-weapon-free world.
11. Decisions about whether the arsenals of NATO's nuclear-armed allies are dismantled, retained, or upgraded are made not by the Icelandic parliament, but by American, British, and French decision-makers. When it comes to Iceland's defence and foreign policy, however, the Icelandic parliament is sovereign. NATO's strategic concepts are in any case not legally binding.

12. Iceland does not possess nuclear weapons, and as a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) it is forbidden from ever acquiring them. In addition, the Icelandic parliament has determined to “ensure that Iceland and its territorial waters are declared free from nuclear weapons, subject to Iceland’s international commitments, with the aim of promoting disarmament and peace”.<sup>1</sup> Iceland is therefore already in compliance with most of the prohibitions contained in the TPNW.
13. From a legal point of view, it is not clear that Iceland would have to make any considerable changes to its current practices were it to join the TPNW. Most important for Iceland is the undertaking contained in the TPNW not to “[a]ssist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party” under the TPNW. In practice, such a commitment would oblige Iceland not to act in a manner that could be seen to support the possession or use of nuclear weapons. Iceland would have to decline to support any language in future NATO strategic concepts that endorsed activities prohibited by the TPNW. NATO members have on several occasions opted out of specific statements in, or attached additional comments to, NATO documents dealing with nuclear weapons.

## **Eliminating nuclear weapons**

14. As a party to the TPNW, Iceland would be in a stronger position to work with other members of the international community to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The TPNW contains mechanism for a diplomatic process to improve and expand the treaty. A refusal to join the TPNW and engage with its processes would cast serious doubt on Iceland’s commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world and could be seen as tacit support for a new and dangerous nuclear arms race.
15. The TPNW is designed to help implement the NPT, which requires all its parties, including Iceland, to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Such negotiations had, until the elaboration and adoption of the TPNW, been at a standstill for more than two decades. The NPT itself envisages the creation of additional legal instruments for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.
16. At a time of great global tension, when nuclear-armed states are modernizing their arsenals and threatening to use their nuclear weapons, it is all the more important for nations such as Iceland to declare their unequivocal opposition to nuclear weapons and to help strengthen international norms against them. In the last few days, two nuclear-armed nations have engaged in armed conflict that threatens us all. Joining the treaty is the only responsible course of action for any and every nation.

***Submitted on 13 January 2020***

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1. Parliamentary Resolution on a National Security Policy for Iceland. Parliamentary document 1166 – Case no. 327. No 26/145. Approved by the Parliament of Iceland on 13 April 2016. Para. 10.





INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC  
HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

## **Submission to Alþingi Inquiry into Resolution 50/750, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum”**

**From the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic  
January 17, 2020**

### **Introduction**

1. The International Human Rights Clinic (“the Clinic”) at Harvard Law School is pleased to make this submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Icelandic Parliament (Alþingi) regarding Resolution 50/150, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum” (“Prohibition of nuclear weapons”).
2. The Clinic participated actively in the negotiations of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). It disseminated numerous publications, made statements in the plenary and at side events, and provided legal advice to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which received the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. Having worked on disarmament issues since 2005, the Clinic has extensive expertise in the creation, analysis, and interpretation of weapons treaties.
3. The Clinic has done significant legal research on the prohibitions contained in the TPNW and their implications for states that are part of military alliances or whose militaries cooperate with nuclear-armed states. This short submission is based on some of the Clinic’s key findings.

### **TPNW’s Consistency with Other Legal Obligations**

4. By signing and ratifying the TPNW, Iceland could better meet its obligations under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Article VI of that treaty requires states parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The TPNW’s prohibitions on nuclear weapons advance Article VI’s goal of nuclear disarmament, and thus joining the TPNW would promote Iceland’s compliance with the NPT.
5. At the same time, Iceland’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should not be considered a legal obstacle to ratification of the TPNW. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty itself does not contain any reference to nuclear weapons or any requirement to participate in nuclear

weapons-related activities.<sup>1</sup> The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept lays out nuclear strategy for the alliance, but it represents a political commitment that is not legally binding.<sup>2</sup>

6. Because the 2010 Strategic Concept treats nuclear weapons as central to NATO's defence policy, some scholars may argue that nuclear weapons-related obligations should be read into the North Atlantic Treaty. That argument falls short in three significant ways. First, as stated above, the North Atlantic Treaty itself contains no requirements related to nuclear weapons. Second, the 2010 Strategic Concept pairs its description of NATO as a "nuclear alliance" with a commitment "to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons." Third, there is a history of differing practices regarding nuclear weapons among NATO states; some countries, including Iceland, have not permitted nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory. Joining the TPNW would represent such a differing nuclear practice as well as a step toward realizing NATO's commitment to a nuclear-free world.

### **Military Operations with State Not Party**

7. Disarmament law precedent indicates that states party to the TPNW may continue to participate in joint military operations with a nuclear-armed state, as long as they do not assist their ally with a nuclear weapons-related act prohibited under the treaty. For example, the prohibitions in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which closely resemble those in the TPNW, have not prevented states parties, including many NATO members, from engaging in joint military operations with the United States, a state not party.
8. The TPNW should be understood, however, to prohibit a state party from accepting a nuclear-armed state's promise to use nuclear weapons on its behalf. Such arrangements would violate the object and purpose of the TPNW, which is to eliminate nuclear weapons in order to prevent human suffering. They would also arguably violate Articles 1(d), 1(e), and 1(f) of the treaty, which prohibit: the threat of use of nuclear weapons; assisting, encouraging, or inducing another state to engage in a prohibited act; and seeking and receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited activity.

### **Iceland's Disarmament Track Record**

9. Finally, joining the TPNW would be in keeping with Iceland's generally strong support for disarmament. Iceland is already a state party to the international treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons, the other weapons of mass destruction. The TPNW closes a legal gap by ensuring that all weapons of mass destruction are prohibited. Iceland has also joined the more recent bans on antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, "humanitarian disarmament" treaties that seek to minimize the unacceptable

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<sup>1</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. (4 April 1949).

<sup>2</sup> "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010.

civilian harm caused by certain weapons. The latest treaty in this line, the TPNW similarly aims to prevent the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of an indiscriminate and inhumane class of weapons. In addition, Iceland has already endorsed a number of international statements highlighting the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and the consequent imperative that these weapons never be used again.<sup>3</sup> By signing and ratifying the TPNW, Iceland would build on its strong disarmament track record while taking action to address its expressed concerns about nuclear weapons.

*For more information, contact:*

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<sup>3</sup> For example: Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 24 April 2013; 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 2015; UN General Assembly First Committee, 67th Session, Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament, 22 October 2012; UN General Assembly First Committee, 68th Session, Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 21 October 2013; UN General Assembly First Committee, 69th Session, Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, 20 October 2014.

Geneva, 14 January 2020

DP\_JUR\_ARMES 20/00001 HDUR/mlöv

Dear Sir, Dear Madam,

Please find enclosed the submission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the Alþingi Inquiry into Resolution 70/150, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum” (“Prohibition of nuclear weapons”).

Yours sincerely,



Helen Durham  
Director of International Law and Policy  
International Committee of the Red Cross

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101 Reykjavík

Encl.: Factsheet Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)  
ICRC responses to key TPNW challenges



# ICRC

## **Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Responses to key challenges**

*This memorandum presents the views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on some key concerns and criticisms that have been raised about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The ICRC will also provide briefing papers on more technical and legal matters on [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org) and through its partners in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.*

Since 1945, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, of which the ICRC is a part, has been calling for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Our call was first driven by the unspeakable suffering caused by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which the ICRC and the Japanese Red Cross witnessed first-hand while attempting to bring relief to the dying and injured. The nuclear blasts had wiped out these cities, instantly killing tens of thousands of people, obliterating medical facilities, and leaving behind appalling conditions for survivors. Tens of thousands more died in the following years due to radiation poisoning. And seven decades on, we still bear witness to the long-term effects of nuclear weapons, as Japanese Red Cross hospitals continue to treat many thousands of victims of cancers caused by radiation exposure.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's call to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons has also been guided by the fact that we would be unable to provide any meaningful humanitarian response in the event of the use of nuclear weapons. The reality is that if a nuclear weapon were to detonate in or near a populated area, there would be an overwhelming number of people in need of treatment, while most of the local medical facilities would be destroyed. Assistance providers would also face serious risks associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. The ICRC's own studies, and those of UN agencies, have found that in most countries and at the international level, there is little capacity and no realistic or coordinated plan to deal with these tremendous challenges.

Our Movement has also expressed deep concern at the increasing risks of use of nuclear weapons by intent, miscalculation or accident<sup>1</sup>. Nuclear weapon States are modernizing their arsenals, developing new kinds of nuclear weapons, and making them easier to use. Military incidents involving nuclear-armed States are occurring with disturbing frequency. At the same time, we see previous restraints steadily falling away, and a deeply concerning erosion of the international framework governing nuclear disarmament and arms control.

The horrific immediate and long-term consequences of nuclear weapons, some of which are described above, can hardly be reconciled with the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law that bind all States. On this basis, in 2011, our Movement appealed to all

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<sup>1</sup> See most recently: Nuclear Weapons: Averting a Global Nuclear Catastrophe, Appeal by Peter Maurer, President of the ICRC, 23 April 2018 (<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-averting-global-catastrophe>).

States to ensure that these weapons are never again used and are eliminated through a legally binding international agreement, based on their existing obligations and commitments. Our Movement has therefore welcomed and called on all States to promptly sign, ratify or accede to, and faithfully implement the 2017 *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW) and other key nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation weapons agreements.<sup>2</sup>

A large number of States, including the 122 States that adopted the Treaty and some others, are currently considering whether to join the 80 States that have already signed and 34 that have ratified or otherwise acceded to the TPNW.

### **1. Defense with weapons that are incompatible with international humanitarian law is never an option.**

A number of critics of the TPNW cite the existing international security environment or current/potential membership in nuclear weapon-based security arrangements as cause for remaining outside the treaty. This can hardly be reconciled with the recognition by all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2010 of the "catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons", with States' commitment in the NPT 2010 Action Plan to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies" and the need to comply with international humanitarian law (IHL). Citing security conditions or "security concerns" as justification for use or threat of use of a weapon the use of which is generally seen as illegal undermines the requirement that States respect IHL in all situations of conflict. It also provides an incentive for other States, many facing immediate security threats, to seek nuclear weapons and/or participation in nuclear alliances for "self-defence" purposes. The argument would thereby justify nuclear proliferation.

### **2. The best way to safeguard the NPT is to implement it.**

Many critics have expressed concern about the impact of the TPNW on the NPT. Yet the TPNW explicitly affirms that the NPT is "the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime" and that its "full and effective implementation" has "a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security".

The TPNW complements and supports the NPT's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Indeed, the TPNW's clear and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons creates a further disincentive for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and represents a concrete step towards implementing the NPT's Article VI obligation to pursue negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament. Concerns about safeguarding the NPT as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament efforts should focus on ensuring the full and effective implementation of its article VI obligations and, in particular, the far-reaching disarmament commitments undertaken in the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

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<sup>2</sup> Council of Delegates resolution CD/17/R4 "Working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons", adopted by consensus.

The absence of an obligation on States Parties to the TPNW to accept safeguards<sup>3</sup> of the IAEA's Additional Protocol is often cited as a weakness of the Treaty. Yet this perceived weakness also exists under the NPT.

It is also important to note that the TPNW foresees the future adoption by States Parties of verification agreements with States that possess nuclear weapons as well as other “measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty”. In this regard, its provisions are stronger than those of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that still has neither verification provisions nor commitments to develop them. Yet it has attracted 183 State Parties.

### **3. National vs human security: a false dilemma.**

All States face their own security concerns. Those that negotiated, adopted, signed and ratified the TPNW face the same unstable international security environment as others. Some are also in security partnerships or alliances with nuclear weapon States or face immediate security threats. Yet most countries see the continuing existence of nuclear weapons as a major source of *insecurity* for their populations and for future generations, and view the past failure to fulfil nuclear disarmament obligations as a driver of current nuclear proliferation challenges, interstate confrontations and the increasing risk of catastrophic conflict.

### **4. Concerns about impact of the TPNW, but where is an alternative strategy?**

Critics of the TPNW offer valid but unanswerable questions about the impact of the TPNW, over time, in promoting nuclear disarmament. Some suggest that adherence to the TPNW is divisive and undermines the unity of purpose needed to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament. This misrepresents the essential character of the Treaty – namely its moral and legal stance *against* nuclear weapons and *against* a potential global nuclear conflagration that could impact all human beings and societies. It establishes a new global norm of international humanitarian and disarmament law that nuclear weapons are not only morally unacceptable but also illegal. Regardless of the time frame one believes is needed to achieve nuclear disarmament, an unambiguous norm establishing the illegality of nuclear weapons will be needed. The TPNW provides this clarity and a vision for all States of the end-state towards which they must move.

The disappointing historical record of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, recent threats of nuclear weapons use and ongoing modernization of arsenals suggest that nuclear weapon States have been unable to make lasting progress on long-standing nuclear disarmament undertakings. There is no reason to believe this will change without countervailing normative pressure from the international community. Many important States also took years, even decades, to adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use

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<sup>3</sup> “Safeguards” are a set of technical measures (e.g. on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation) applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to bilateral agreements concluded with States, that aim to ensure that the State is using nuclear material and technology solely for peaceful purposes, and to confirm that these are not being misused or diverted for nuclear weapons activities. There are two principal types of safeguards agreements administered by the IAEA: (1) the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), which is the minimum standard that all non-nuclear weapon NPT States Parties are required to adhere to pursuant to Article III of the NPT, and (2) the Additional Protocol (AP), which these States may voluntarily enter into and which contains safeguards that are more intrusive than those of the CSA.

of chemical and biological weapons. Yet the Protocol helped prevent the use of such weapons in most subsequent conflicts, even though not all major military powers had adhered to it.

In light of the above, it is unfortunate that the TPNW is often criticized without providing an alternative strategy for addressing the current trend of steadily increasing risks of nuclear weapon use, for reversing modernization programs that are making nuclear weapons more useable or for time-bound implementation of the many crucial commitments made by State Parties to the NPT in its 2010 Action Plan and on many previous occasions. Criticism without alternatives simply reinforces an increasingly dangerous status quo.

In reality, the TPNW's overall success and impact depend on the broadest possible adherence by a wide variety of States including neutral States, developing countries, regional leaders, those associated with nuclear weapon-based military arrangements and, eventually, by all States.

The concrete evidence now available of the massive, indiscriminate and irreparable health, environmental and societal impacts of nuclear weapons and of their inconsistency with international humanitarian law should not be weighed against unpredictable security scenarios or questions about impacts of the TPNW that will only be answered by historians. Judgments about the TPNW should be based on the responsibility of all States to protect humanity from the scourge of a nuclear catastrophe that would add extraordinary levels of human suffering to current unmet needs, and on States' long standing obligations under international humanitarian and disarmament law.

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*"We know now more than ever before that the risks are too high, the dangers too real. It is time for States, and all those in a position to influence them, to act with urgency and determination to bring the era of nuclear weapons to an end."*

*Peter Maurer, President of the ICRC  
Statement to the Geneva diplomatic corps, 18 February 2015*





ICRC

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ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

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## 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the first globally applicable multilateral agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. It is also the first to include provisions to help address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use and testing. The Treaty complements existing international agreements on nuclear weapons, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The TPNW was adopted by a United Nations diplomatic conference on 7 July 2017 and opened for signature on 20 September 2017. It will enter into force once 50 States have notified the UN Secretary-General that they agree to be bound by it.

### What is the purpose and scope of the TPNW?

The TPNW was developed in response to long-standing concerns about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that any use of nuclear weapons would entail.

The Treaty recognizes that the use of nuclear weapons would be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, and it comprehensively prohibits nuclear weapons on the basis of international humanitarian law (IHL) – the body of law that governs the use of all weapons in armed conflict. It contains strong commitments to assistance of the victims of nuclear weapon use and testing, and to the remediation of contaminated environments. The Treaty also provides pathways for adherence by all States, including those that

possess, or are associated with, nuclear weapons.

### Aren't nuclear weapons already prohibited under international law?

In a 1996 Advisory Opinion,<sup>1</sup> the International Court of Justice concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly the principles and rules of IHL. However, it left open the question of the lawfulness of threatening to use or using nuclear weapons in an extreme situation of self-defence in which the very survival of a State is at stake. Thus, the Court did not construe IHL to categorically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

In addition to the principles and rules of IHL, there are a number of multilateral agreements that

regulate nuclear weapons. However, none of these establishes a comprehensive set of prohibitions applicable at the global level. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a cornerstone of international law governing nuclear weapons. It prohibits State Parties that do not already have nuclear weapons from developing or acquiring them. State Parties that possessed nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT's adoption are allowed to retain their weapons but are barred from transferring them or helping others to develop or acquire them. All NPT States Parties are required to pursue negotiations on effective measures to advance nuclear disarmament.

A number of treaties also establish parts of the world as nuclear-weapon-free zones. These treaties generally contain

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<sup>1</sup> International Court of Justice, "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", Advisory Opinion, *I.C.J. Reports* 1996, 1996, pp. 226–267.

prohibitions on a wide range of nuclear-weapon-related activities that are applicable in that region. Such treaties are in force in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central and South-East Asia.

Until now, nuclear weapons had not been the subject of a globally applicable prohibition treaty that all States could join. The adoption of the TPNW has filled this gap.

### **What are the main obligations of the TPNW?**

#### ***Prohibition***

It is prohibited under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices). It is equally prohibited to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile them (Art. 1.1(a) and (d)).

It is also prohibited for a State Party to transfer nuclear weapons, to receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or to allow the stationing, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control (Art. 1.1(b), (c) and (g)).

Furthermore, it is prohibited to in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the Treaty (Art. 1.1(e)).

#### ***Elimination of nuclear weapons***

Within 30 days of becoming a party to the Treaty, a State must submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General indicating if:

- it has previously possessed nuclear weapons,
- it currently possesses such weapons, or
- there are nuclear weapons of another State in any place under its jurisdiction or control (Art. 2).

The answers to these questions determine the next steps a State Party must take to ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons:

- A State Party that **did not possess nuclear weapons** on the date that the Treaty was adopted (7 July 2017) and has an existing safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must maintain that agreement (Art. 3.1).

If the State does not have safeguards obligations in force, it must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This agreement must enter into force within 18 months from the date on which the State became a State Party (Art. 3.2).

- A State Party that **possessed nuclear weapons after 7 July 2017 and destroyed them prior to joining the Treaty** must cooperate with an international authority mandated to verify the irreversible elimination of the State's nuclear weapon programme. This authority will be designated by a meeting of States Parties. The State Party must also conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA (Art. 4.1).
- A State that **possesses or controls nuclear weapons at the time that it becomes a State Party** must immediately remove its weapons from operational status. It must also destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be established by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of the State Party's nuclear weapon programme (Art. 4.2). The State Party must also conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA (Art. 4.3).

- A State Party that **has the nuclear weapons of another State on its territory** (via stationing, installation or deployment) must ensure that such weapons are removed as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties (Art. 4.4).

#### ***Victim assistance and environmental remediation***

The Treaty recognizes the suffering and harm caused to the victims of nuclear weapon use and testing as well as the impact on indigenous peoples and the environment.

A State Party with individuals under its jurisdiction who are victims of nuclear weapon use or testing must provide them with medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, and provide for their socio-economic inclusion (Art. 6.1).

Similarly, a State Party whose territory has been contaminated through nuclear weapon use or testing must take measures towards the environmental remediation of affected areas (Art. 6.2).

#### ***International assistance and cooperation***

States Parties must cooperate to facilitate the successful implementation of the Treaty. Each State Party also has the right to seek and receive assistance to fulfil the Treaty's requirements (Art. 7.1 and 7.2).

This cooperation is fortified by a requirement to assist States Parties affected by nuclear weapons. Each State Party in a position to do so must provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties that have been affected by nuclear weapon use or testing, to help them implement the Treaty. They must also assist the victims of nuclear weapon use or testing (Art. 7.3 and 7.4).

Assistance can be provided through the United Nations,

international or regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or on a bilateral basis (Art. 7.5).

### **What must a State do to join the Treaty?**

The Treaty remains open for signature indefinitely and can be signed at UN headquarters in New York.

The Treaty will enter into force 90 days after the deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the UN Secretary-General, the Treaty's depositary.

A State that wishes to be bound by the Treaty must submit an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the UN Secretary-General. It will become binding upon that State 90 days later or, for the first 50 States that ratify, upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

### **What must States do to implement the Treaty and how is compliance ensured?**

#### ***Adoption of domestic measures***

Each State Party is required to take all necessary measures to implement the Treaty's provisions (Art. 5). This includes the adoption of legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any violations committed by persons, or on territory, under its jurisdiction or control (Art. 5.2). To this end, depending on the State's domestic law and procedure, specific domestic legislation may need to be adopted and the regulations governing the armed forces amended.

In addition, States must take measures towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the provision of victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international

assistance and cooperation in accordance with the respective obligations under the Treaty (Art. 5).

#### ***Meetings of States Parties***

The implementation of the Treaty is monitored through meetings of States Parties. A first meeting of States Parties will be convened within one year of the Treaty's entry into force. These meetings will assess the Treaty's status and implementation and take decisions to advance the elimination of nuclear weapons (Art. 4). Additional meetings will be held on a biennial basis, unless States Parties decide otherwise (Art. 8.1 and 8.2).

#### **What support is available for joining and implementing the TPNW?**

The status of signatures and ratifications of the TPNW is available online: [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=en).

The ICRC has prepared publications to assist States in understanding the Treaty's requirements. This includes a ratification kit describing the procedures that a State must follow in order to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the TPNW. The kit also contains model instruments of signature and adherence for States to deposit with the UN Secretary-General. These materials can be found on the ICRC website ([www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)).

The ICRC is ready to assist States in implementing the TPNW, within the scope of its mandate and expertise in IHL.

The ICRC's delegations throughout the world and its Department of International Law and Policy in Geneva can provide guidance on implementing the Treaty's requirements in domestic legislation and any further information or clarification that may be required.

Assistance to implement various aspects of the Treaty may also be provided through National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Federation of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

A number of other organizations, such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, have also prepared important tools to help States understand and implement the TPNW.

**04.2018**



## Submission by PAX to Alþingi inquiry into resolution 57 / 149, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum”

Submitted 13 March 2019  
Resubmitted 13 January 2020

### Contact

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### Introduction

PAX is pleased to make the following submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Icelandic parliament (Alþingi) in support of resolution 57 / 149 “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum” (“Prohibition of nuclear weapons”).

PAX is a Netherlands based civil society organisation engaging on a wide range of issues. PAX works together with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build just peace. The Humanitarian Disarmament unit within PAX seeks to prevent and remediate arms-inflicted human suffering and environmental harm through the establishment of norms. This approach to disarmament is people-centred in substance and process.

### Background

The real threat of use of nuclear weapons is increasing, dramatically. Taboo against the use of nuclear weapons alone will not reduce these risks. Some efforts, such as de-alerting will help reduce risk, although de-coupling warheads from delivery systems has more impact, and neither eliminates risk completely. States joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons recognise the risks of any use of nuclear weapons, and explicitly prohibited use, under any circumstances, as a way to – at least- strengthen the slipping taboo.

### Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on the financial sector.

The language in the TPNW on assistance mirrors that in the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the Oxford Public International Law commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, assistance is understood to include the provision “*through financial resources.... to anyone who is resolved to engage in such prohibited activity*” and anyone that could be “*not only be a State, irrespective of whether or not it is a Party to the Convention, but also an organization, an enterprise, a person, or a group of persons, regardless of Citizenship.*”<sup>1</sup>

As a result, the prohibition on assistance in the TPNW is increasingly understood by financial sector actors to also prohibit investments in the private companies producing nuclear weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary, Edited By: Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer, Ralf Trapp, August 2014, Oxford Commentaries on International Law,

Across the financial sector, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is already having an impact. In the first year after the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017, 30 Financial Institutions previously known to have investment in companies associated with the production of nuclear weapons, ended their financial relationships.<sup>2</sup>

There are a number of financial institutions that have also cited the TPNW as justification for ending their exposure to the companies associated with the production of nuclear weapons. These include, but are not limited to: Amalgamated Bank (US); ABP (the Netherlands); KBC (Belgium).<sup>3</sup>

Experience with other prohibited weapons systems, notably cluster munitions, shows that the financial sector is quick to reject exposure to companies alleged to be associated with prohibited weapon production.

Also in the case of cluster munitions, it is seen that stopping the financial flow to weapons producing companies has proven to directly impact them. For example, citing pressure from financial institutions, several producers of cluster munitions have stopped their production, including Textron, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK and Singapore Technologies Engineering – even though they are all from states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

Already the Don't Bank on the Bomb research shows there are at least 23 financial institutions around the world with comprehensive policies preventing any type of financial exposure to any type of companies associated with producing (key components) of nuclear weapons. An additional 40 institutions have policies limiting their financial exposure.<sup>4</sup>

### **Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on other nuclear endorsing states - Dutch case study.**

The Dutch government was the only government of a country currently endorsing the use of nuclear weapons on its behalf and including nuclear weapons in its security strategy to participate in the negotiations of the TPNW.

Despite pressure to boycott, the Dutch government participated in the negotiations for several reasons- including parliamentary pressure, citizen pressure and a long-standing self-promotion as a bridge builder between the nuclear armed and the rest of the world.

Since 2010, the second chamber of the Dutch Parliament (Tweede Kamer) has adopted, by majority, no less than fourteen motions relating to nuclear disarmament. These motions have included a number of repeated calls for increased transparency about US forward deployed weapons allegedly in the Netherlands, and several motions have demanded an intensification of the government's effort towards a nuclear weapons free world.<sup>5</sup>

In 2016, a campaign coalition consisting of PAX, the Dutch Red Cross, and ASN Bank launched a citizens initiative calling on the chamber to debate national legislation making nuclear weapons illegal. Over 45,000 Dutch citizens supported the call, triggering a debate in the chamber.

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<sup>2</sup> Maaïke Beenes and Susi Snyder (2018) Don't Bank on the Bomb. Utrecht, the Netherlands: PAX, p. 6. Available at: [https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018\\_report\\_web/](https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/2018_report_web/).

<sup>3</sup> Susi Snyder, website *Don't Bank on the Bomb*, (4 July 2018), available: <https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/happy-birthday-tpnw-have-some-divestment/>

<sup>4</sup> Beenes and Snyder (2018), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> An overview of all nuclear weapon related motions can be found here (in Dutch): <https://nonukes.nl/overzicht-van-aangenomen-moties-in-de-tweede-kamer-over-nucleaire-ontwapening/>

The debate in April 2016 resulted in several motions put forward during the debate, four of which received majority support during the voting session. Overwhelming the chamber voted to support the start of negotiations on an international treaty banning nuclear weapons calling on the government to participate without prejudice to the outcome, in addition parliament also endorsed the proposal to disclose the secret treaties on the basis of which nuclear weapons were placed in the Netherlands. MPs also supported the request to use the unwanted modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe to boost global nuclear disarmament. Lastly, the House called on the Dutch government to work with the United States to end any Dutch reliance on nuclear weapons.<sup>6</sup>

The Dutch government subsequently participated in the negotiations, though ultimately voted against the adoption of the Treaty in July 2017. The Parliament has recently requested, through another motion adopted 28 November 2018, that the government conduct a legal analysis on ways to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs responded to the 28 November 2018 request of parliament by letter on 30 January 2019. The response stated that the starting point is that rules of international law are part of the Dutch legal system. The ministry went on to explain that there are no obligations arising under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that would require adjustment to existing Dutch legislation, although further implementing legislation would need to be adopted.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, representative surveys have shown that a large majority of the Dutch population, like populations from other European countries, think that the Dutch government should sign the TPNW.<sup>8</sup>

Continued pressure from parliament is likely to encourage the government to participate in all discussions possible related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as it has done to date while making preparations to join the TPNW. The Icelandic government should follow this example and while making preparations to join the TPNW attend future meetings of the TPNW as an observer state. It was beneficial for the Dutch government to be able to present first-hand knowledge of negotiations to parliament and the public, such attendance will enable Iceland to follow developments and avoid misconceptions.

## Conclusion

PAX appreciates the opportunity to submit evidence towards this request. We continue to urge the Icelandic Government to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as part of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and that countries and entities within their jurisdictions will be adhering to it. Until it is prepared to join as a state party, Iceland should at least commit to attending future meetings of the TPNW as an observer. We remain at the disposal of the committee should further information be useful.

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<sup>6</sup> More information including links to the relevant resolutions (in Dutch) can be found here: <https://nonukes.nl/netherlands-actively-negotiate-international-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty/>

<sup>7</sup> Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs S.A. Blok, 30 January 2019, "Uitvoering van de motie van het lid Voordewind over draagvlak voor het VN-verdrag inzake kernwapenverbod (Kamerstuk 33694-31)", available: <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=85cac856-f697-4ff6-afd2-7f13081a21fc&title=Uitvoering%20van%20de%20motie%20van%20het%20lid%20Voordewind%20over%20draagvlak%20voor%20het%20VN-verdrag%20inzake%20kernwapenverbod%20%28Kamerstuk%2033694-31%29%20.pdf>


<sup>8</sup> ICAN (July 2018) "One year on: European attitudes toward Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", page 6, available at [http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/YouGov\\_ICAN\\_EUNATOTPNW2018.pdf](http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/YouGov_ICAN_EUNATOTPNW2018.pdf)

Utanríkismálanefnd Alþingis  
Austurstræti 8-10  
150 Reykjavík

Reykjavík, 14. janúar 2020

Meðfylgjandi er umsögn Rauða krossins á Íslandi um tillögu til þingsályktunar um samning Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum, 150. löggjafarþing 2019-2020. Þingskjal 70 – 70. mál.

Virðingarfyllt,  
f.h. Rauða krossins á Íslandi



Kristín S. Hjálmtýsdóttir,  
framkvæmdastjóri.



# UMSÖGN RAUÐA KROSSINS Á ÍSLANDI

um

tillögu til þingsályktunar um samning Sameinuðu þjóðanna um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum.

**150. löggjafarþing 2019-2020.**

**Þingskjal 70 – 70. mál.**

## I. Inngangur

Rauði krossin á Íslandi fagnar því að á ný sé lögð fram þingsályktunartillaga þess efnis að Alþingi álykti að fela ríkisstjórn Íslands, fyrir Íslands hönd, undirritun og fullgildingu samnings um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum sem samþykktur var á ráðstefnu Sameinuðu þjóðanna í New York þann 7. júlí 2017.

Rauði krossinn á Íslandi er hluti af stærstu mannúðarhreyfingu veraldar. Eitt af verkefnum félagsins er að breiða út þekkingu alþjóðlegra mannúðarlaga, gera grein fyrir mikilvægi þeirra og þrýsta á íslensk stjórnvöld að virða þjóðréttarlegar skuldbindingar sínar í samræmi við aðild sína að Genfarsamningunum fjórum frá 1949, viðbótarbókunum við þá frá 1977 og 2005, sem og aðrar skuldbindingar á sviði mannúðarréttar.

Alþjóðaráð Rauða krossins (e. *International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC*), er verndari Genfarsamningana og viðauka við þá. ICRC leggur mikla áherslu á að ríki fullgildi alþjóðasamninga á sviði mannúðarréttar og hefur frá árinu 1945 vakið athygli á alvarlegum afleiðingum notkunar kjarnorkuvopna og talað fyrir útrýmingu þeirra.

Samningur um bann við kjarnorkuvopnum (e. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW*) var samþykktur af 122 ríkjum á ráðstefnu Sameinuðu þjóðanna í New York þann 7. júlí 2017. Eins og fram hefur komið í fyrri umsögnum Rauða krossins er tilurð TPNW svar við ákalli ICRC um lagalegt bindandi samkomulag á grundvelli alþjóðlegra skuldbindinga og samþykta, um algjört bann við notkun kjarnorkuvopna sem tryggja skuli eyðingu og afnám slíkra vopna. Samningurinn undirstrikar þá alvarlegu hættu sem stafar af áframhaldandi tilvist kjarnorkuvopna og þeim óafturkræfu og geryðandi afleiðingum sem slík vopn valda. Samningurinn er skýr um algjört bann á hvers kyns notkun kjarnorkuvopna í samræmi við alþjóðleg mannúðarlög.

Afstaða Rauða krossins á Íslandi í umsögn um þingsályktunartillögu þessa er í samræmi við afstöðu ICRC til TPNW ásamt grundvallargildum Rauða kross hreyfingarinnar um mannúð, óhlutdrægni og hlutleysi sem og stefnu Rauða kross hreyfingarinnar og Rauða hálfmánans.

## II. Almennar athugasemdir

Rauði krossinn á Íslandi áréttar áður framkomnar athugasemdir sem sendar voru utanríkismálanefnd þann 12. júní 2018 og aftur þann 18. mars 2019 vegna samhljóða þingsályktunartillagna sem lagðar voru fram á 148. löggjafarþingi 2017-2018 og á 149. löggjafarþingi 2018-2019.



Í fyrri umsögn Rauða krossin á Íslandi frá 12. júní 2018 kemur m.a. fram að íslensk stjórnvöld ættu að setja í forgang undirritun og fullgildingu samningsins vegna skelfilegra afleiðinga sem hvers kyns notkun kjarnorkuvopna hefur á hnattræna vísu og þeirrar vár sem af slíkum vopnum stafar.

Í viðbótarathugasemdum í umsögn Rauða krossins þann 18. mars 2019 kemur fram að afstaða íslenskra stjórnvalda gagnvart undirritun og fullgildingu TPNW byggist einna helst á aðild Íslands að Atlantshafsbandalaginu (NATO) og í því samhengi þjóðaröryggisstefnu Íslands sem samþykkt var á Alþingi 13. apríl 2016. Sú stefna leggi áherslu á aðild Íslands að NATO og þær skuldbindingar sem af henni leiða. Í því samhengi hafi verið vísað til grunnstefnu NATO frá 2010 þar sem fram kemur að kjarnorkuvopn séu hluti af fælingar- og varnarstefnu bandalagsins og TPNW gangi því í berhögg við skuldbindingar Íslands gagnvart NATO.

Í því samhengi árétti Rauði krossinn að aðild Íslands að NATO teljist *ekki lagaleg hindrun* fyrir undirritun og fullgildingu TPNW. Í texta Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins frá 1949 sé hvergi minnst á kjarnorkuvopn né gerð krafa um að aðildarríki taki þátt í nokkurri starfsemi tengdri kjarnorkuvopnum. Áðurnefnd grunnstefna NATO frá 2010 setji fram kjarnorkuáætlun fyrir bandalagið sem felur í sér pólitíska skuldbindingu sem *ekki* sé lagalega bindandi fyrir aðildarríkin og því þau ekki bundin að lögum til að styðja fælingar- og varnarstefnu bandalagsins þegar kemur að mögulegri notkun kjarnorkuvopna.

Rauði krossinn undirstrikar að íslenska ríkið hafi ekki í eigu nein kjarnorkuvopn og aðild þess að samningnum um bann við útbreiðslu kjarnorkuvopna (e. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT*) frá árinu 1968 knýji á um algjört bann við því að íslenska ríkið afli slíkra vopna. Þá hafi stjórnvöld með markmiðum sínum í þjóðaröryggisstefnu fyrir Ísland, gefið út að þau muni beita sér fyrir vitundarvakningu og opinni umræðu um kjarnorkumál og stuðla að afvopnun og friði. Jafnframt að Íslendingar skuli beita sér fyrir vopnatak mörkunum og afvopnun, m.a. í flokki kjarnorkuvopna, á vettvangi alþjóðastofnana og í tvíhliða samskiptum við önnur ríki. Þá bendir Rauði krossinn á að fullgilding TPNW feli ekki í sé verulegar breytingar á núverandi afstöðu Íslands til notkunar kjarnorkuvopna. Íslandi hafi þegar fullgilt mikilvæga alþjóðlega sáttmála um bann við þróun, framleiðslu og notkun efnavopna og klasasprengrja. Fullgilding og aðild Íslands að TPNW myndi hinsvegar brúa mikilvægt bil í lagalegu samhengi þar sem að samningurinn er afdráttalaus, skýr og marghliða, þ.e. opinn öllum ríkjum og leggur allsherjARBann við hverskyns notkun kjarnorkuvopna. Því ætti Ísland, sem ábyrgt ríki í alþjóðasamfélaginu, að vera leiðandi í átt að kjarnorkuvopnalausum heimi, sýna gott fordæmi og fullgilda TPNW sem leggur skýlaust bann við notkun verstu geryðingarvopnanna, kjarnorkuvopna.

Ljóst þykir að markmiðinu um kjarnorkuvopnalausán heim verði ekki náð með afstöðu þess efnis að kjarnorkuvopn hafi gildi í öryggisstefnu landsins. Tilvísun til sjónarmiða um öryggi og varnarstefnu sem fram komi í grunnstefnu NATO, sem réttlæting á beitingu eða hótun um beitingu kjarnorkuvopna, grafi, að mati Rauða krossins, undan grundvallarlögum mannúðarréttar sem leggi bann við notkun slíkra geryðingarvopna. Slík sjónarmiðið geti verið hvati fyrir önnur ríki, sem jafnvel standa frammi fyrir knýjandi ógn á öryggi sínu, til kaupa eða jafnvel notkunar á kjarnorkuvopnum með öryggisstjórnarmið og sjálfsvörn að leiðarljósi. Framangreind sjónarmið um öryggi, fælingu og varnarstefnu í grunnstefnu NATO séu því að mati Rauða krossins, til þess fallin að réttlæta útbreiðslu kjarnorkuvopna. Þá er jafnframt bent á að þrátt fyrir framangreind sjónarmið í grunnstefnu NATO kveði hún einnig á um það markmið að skapa skilyrði fyrir heim án kjarnorkuvopna sem sé *samhljóða grundvallar tilgangi TPNW*.

Rauði krossinn hvetji því íslensk stjórnvöld til þess að taka af skarið, sýna öðrum NATO ríkjum mikilvægt fordæmi og taka skref í átt að fullgildingu TPNW. Með vísan í ofangreint telji Rauði krossinn ljóst að fullgilding TPNW *gangi ekki í berhögg við skuldbindingar Íslands gagnvart NATO*.

Að lokum telji Rauði krossinn að aðild Íslands að TPNW sé nauðsynleg til þess að styrkja enn fremur stöðu þeirra alþjóðlegu samninga um kjarnorkuvopn sem Ísland á nú þegar aðild að, n.t.t. NPT og samninginn um bann við tilraunum með kjarnorkuvopn e. *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, CTBT*). Með undirritun og fullgildingu TPNW sé því fyllt upp í mikilvægar eyður sem fyrri samningar hafa ekki kveðið á um, auk þess sem samningurinn stuðlar að bættri fylgni við NPT.

### III. Athugasemdir til viðbótar við fyrri umsögn RKÍ frá 18. mars 2019

Kjarnorkuvopn eru þau vopn sem hafa hvað mestan eyðileggingarmátt. Engin læknis- eða mannúðaraðstoð er möguleg strax í kjölfar kjarnorkuárásar. Til frambúðar hefur slík árás skelfilegar afleiðingar í för með sér fyrir mannfolk, dýraríki, umhverfi og loftslag. Notkun einungis lítills hluta af kjarnorkuvopnalager heims getur leitt af sér algjört landbúnaðarhrun og útbreidda hungursneið, ásamt skyndilegri hitalækkun og minnkun úrkomu á heimsvísu vegna reyks- og rykmyndunar. Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum er því eina tryggingin gegn notkun slíkra vopna og þeim afleiðingum sem notkun þeirra skapar.

Í ljósi ofangreinds, vill Rauði krossinn á Íslandi koma á framfæri myndbandi sem ber nafnið „*What if We Nuke a City*“<sup>1</sup> og var framleitt haustið 2019 af Alþjóðaráði Rauða krossins í samstarfi við þýska teiknimyndafyrirtækið „Kurzegesagt-In a nutshell“. Í myndbandinu er greint frá átakanlegum staðreyndum í kjölfar kjarnorkuárásar á nútíma borg. Veflink á myndbandið má finna hér neðst á síðunni.

Þegar þetta er ritað hafa 80 ríki undirritað samninginn og 34 ríki fullgilt hann, nú síðast Samveldið Dómíníka þann 18. október 2019. Þegar 50 ríki hafa fullgilt samninginn tekur hann gildi.

### Lokaorð

Að svara ekki ákalli Sameinuðu þjóðanna um samning um algjört bann við notkun kjarnorkuvopna, og þátttöku þeirra ríkja sem undirritað og fullgilt hafa TPNW, dregur verulega úr trúverðugleika á því markmiði íslenskra stjórnvalda að stuðla að kjarnorkuvopnalausri veröld.

Rauði krossinn hvetur sem fyrr Alþingi til þess að leggja fram frumvarp sem heimilar ríkisstjórninni að gera nauðsynlegar ráðstafanir til þess að Ísland verði fullgildur aðili að samningnum eins fljótt og auðið er og stuðla þannig enn frekar að þátttöku Íslands í þeirri mikilvægu vegferð ríkja að stíga skref í átt að algjöru kjarnorkubanni á heimsvísu.

Með aðild sinni að TPNW sýna íslensk stjórnvöld frumkvæði og undirstrika á skýran og ábyrgðarfullan hátt að þau séu tilbúin að stíga næstu skref sem nauðsynleg eru til að stuðla að alheimsmarkmiði um kjarnorkuvopnalausán heim.

Rauði krossinn vill koma því á framfæri að fulltrúar félagsins eru tilbúnir til að hitta utanríkismálanefnd til þess að ræða framangreindar athugasemdir og svara spurningum sé þess óskað.

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<sup>1</sup> Hægt er að horfa á myndbandið með því að smella á eftirfarandi slóð:  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iPH-br\\_eJQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5iPH-br_eJQ)

**Submission by Prof Tom Sauer (Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium) to Alþingi inquiry into resolution 70/150 “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum”.**

**Formal goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

The formal goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (or Ban Treaty) is to declare nuclear weapons illegal. It is indeed strange that biological and chemical weapons, let alone landmines and cluster munitions, have been declared illegal in the past, and nuclear weapons – that are potentially much more destructive – not. The Treaty wants to make an end to this legal gap.

The Treaty is the result of the Humanitarian Initiative that aimed at focusing on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for individual human beings and societies at large. The NGOs and states that are behind the Initiative felt that this crucial aspect in the debate about the future role of nuclear weapons was largely forgotten. The debate during and also after the Cold War focused instead on the sophisticated non-use of nuclear weapons amongst states, read nuclear deterrence. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 yielded the wrong impression that they will never be used “because of deterrence”. The latter is a myth. There are historical examples where nuclear armed states have been attacked by non-nuclear weapon states (e.g. Israel in 1973). As a result, nuclear weapons are not a ‘deus ex machina’ that bans war between states. The theory and practice of nuclear deterrence has already failed, and in all likelihood will fail again in the future.

Probably the major lesson learned from the Humanitarian Conferences in the period 2013-2014 was that our societies are not prepared for even small-scale nuclear weapons attacks, let alone nuclear war, and that societies cannot be prepared. In combination with another outcome of the Humanitarian Initiative, namely that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be squared with modern international humanitarian law (e.g. distinction between civilians and military during war), this led to the conclusion at the Humanitarian Conferences that everything should be done to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The best way to prevent nuclear weapons use is their elimination. The best first step, according to 122 states in the world (= two thirds of the states in the world), towards elimination consists in declaring nuclear weapons illegal. This is in a nutshell why and how the Ban Treaty came into existence.

**Unstated goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

The major unstated goal of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is to trigger a new societal and political debate about the role of nuclear weapons in defense doctrines inside the nuclear armed states (= 9) and their allies. The non-nuclear weapon states understand that simply asking the nuclear armed states to disarm, despite their legal obligation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to disarm (art.6), apparently does not work. The historical track record since 1970 (= entry into force of the NPT) makes that abundantly clear. The non-nuclear weapon states have made their point of view crystal clear during each and every NPT Review Conference. At some of these Review Conferences, the nuclear weapon states (= 5 formal ones) promised steps in the direction of nuclear elimination and succeeded the non-nuclear weapon states to agree with a Final Document. It is the belief of the author that this period is over. The non-nuclear weapon states do not believe anymore that the nuclear weapon states are acting ‘in good faith’ with respect to nuclear disarmament. They have been promised different steps, and more or less none were implemented. Anno 2020, there are still 15,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nine nuclear armed states. That ridicules the promise of nuclear disarmament of the NPT. Many of the nuclear weapons are still operational and hundreds are still kept ready to be fired in a very short time. Only one of the nuclear weapon states has announced a no first use doctrine. And all of them are modernizing their nuclear weapons arsenals for billions of dollars, so they can keep nuclear weapons

for another 60-80 years. Again, that makes a mockery of the promise of nuclear disarmament (article 6) of the NPT, and is perceived as such by the non-nuclear weapon states, who are on their turn supposed to keep their obligations under the same treaty. This discriminatory regime is not tenable in term. It is hard to see how the NPT will survive another decade. That has nothing to do with the Prohibition Treaty, but only with the lack of nuclear disarmament efforts by the nuclear weapon states.

The hope of the advocates of the Prohibition Treaty is that the potential stigmatizing effects of the Treaty will make a difference in the policy of at least some of the nuclear armed states, and this on the basis of a three-step model.

#### Step 1: From banning to stigmatization

There exists already a norm that corresponds to the idea that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used. Nina Tannenwald (Brown University) calls this the nuclear taboo. The Ban Treaty is supposed to strengthen this norm further, also by extending the norm to the possession of nuclear weapons. The hope is that Ban Treaty will stigmatize nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon states. Just like Syria under President Assad (having used chemical weapons) is regarded as a pariah state, the hope is that the nine states that possess nuclear weapons will be more and more regarded as pariah states in the future.

#### Step 2: From stigmatization to a renewed debate

Once the stigmatization process is under way, it may help the advocates of change inside the nuclear armed states to begin a new societal and political discussion about the future role of nuclear weapons. The Ban Treaty and the resulting stigmatization may also open the eyes of people who were not yet aware of the danger of nuclear weapons.

#### Step 3: From a renewed debate to policy changes

A renewed debate inside the nuclear armed states and their allies may lead to policy changes in the sense of abandoning the policy of nuclear deterrence. For allies, that means clearly communicating to one's own public opinion and to the rest of the Alliance that the country does not want to be covered any longer by the extended nuclear deterrent. But that does not mean ending membership of the Alliance.

Once one nuclear armed state or allied state changes its policy in this regard, it is likely that others will follow. To be clear, this is not an argument for unilateral disarmament of the West versus the East, or vice versa. Allied states inside NATO or even countries like the UK and France can easily give up nuclear weapons and abandon the practice of relying on (extended) nuclear deterrence without creating an imbalance between the West and the East. In the end, all remaining nuclear armed states will have to sit around the table (together with the non-nuclear weapon states) and start multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (like the Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention). The latter has to determine how one goes to Global Zero, including a timetable (just like the Chemical Weapons Convention).

### **Current impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

Already today, the Ban Treaty is triggering positive effects with respect to stigmatization. The Norwegian pension fund, a large Dutch pension fund, and more recently the KBC, which is the biggest Belgian bank, decided to divest from nuclear weapons related business. Banks make a distinction between legal and illegal weapon systems. In its press release in June 2018, KBC explicitly referred to

the Ban Treaty. Stigmatization seems to be working. Once the Ban Treaty enters into force, most states in the world (and many people inside the nuclear armed states and their allies) will define nuclear weapons as illegal weapon systems. This will in all likelihood trigger similar reactions as that of the KBC in many more private firms around the world. The renewed debate, in other words, has already started, and will get another boost once the Treaty enters into force.

### **The potential role of Iceland**

The next step is that one of the non-nuclear weapon states inside NATO decides to follow the private sector by abandoning its policies of reliance on nuclear deterrence. Just like Belgium played a crucial role in negotiating the Landmine Treaty, just like countries like Austria, Norway, and Mexico played important roles in the Humanitarian Initiative, and just like the Netherlands (under pressure from the Parliament) withstood the pressure from the US, the UK and France and the other NATO member states by being present at the multilateral negotiations for the Ban Treaty at the UN, Iceland may take up its responsibility by being the first NATO member state to signal to the rest of the world that it takes its responsibility to bring the world closer towards nuclear elimination, in line with article 6 of the NPT. Iceland has already a policy that states that it does not allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory. Signing the Ban Treaty is the next logical further step. Or is the status-quo a valid alternative ?

Submitted on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January 2020

### Other publications by the same author about the same topic:

Tom Sauer, *Nuclear Arms Control. Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Period* (Macmillan, London, 1998).

Tom Sauer, *Nuclear Elimination. The Role of Missile Defense* (Hurst & Co, London, 2011).

Tom Sauer and Joellen Pretorius, 'Nuclear weapons and the Humanitarian approach', in: *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol.26 (3), 2014, pp.233-250.

Tom Sauer, 'It is time to outlaw nuclear weapons', in: *The National Interest*, 18th of April 2016.

Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, 'The Ban Treaty: a Sign of Global Impatience', in: *Survival*, vol.60 (2), 2018, pp.61-72.

Tom Sauer and Mathias Reveraert, 'The potential stigmatizing effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', in: *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol.25, 5-6, 2018 (forthcoming, already available online since December 2018).

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR  
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## WILPF submission to Alþingi inquiry into resolution 57/149, “Bann við kjarnorkuvopnum”

8 March 2019

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)<sup>1</sup> supports the call for Iceland’s government to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Other supportive submissions on resolution 57/149 may focus on the importance of the Treaty for preventing humanitarian harm from nuclear weapons and the legal and political ramifications of Icelandic ratification—in particular please see the submission from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). WILPF would like to focus on some of the important gender and feminist aspects of nuclear weapons and the TPNW, emphasising the relevancy of resolution 57/149 for Iceland’s commitment to gender equality and justice.

1. The use, testing, and development of nuclear weapons have disproportionate physical and social impacts on women and girls. Women and girls’ bodies are more susceptible to ionising radiation and thus are more likely to develop cancers when exposed.<sup>2</sup> In addition, women and girls who have been harmed by the use or testing of nuclear weapons have experienced social stigma as well as differential psychological and cultural impacts.<sup>3</sup>
2. Women and non-binary/non-conforming people continue to be vastly under-represented in nuclear weapon policy discussions and decision making. In 2016, roughly 70 percent of delegates to nuclear weapon and other disarmament related meetings at the United Nations were men.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> WILPF is the oldest women’s peace organisation in the world, founded in 1915. It has ECOSOC status at the United Nations, National Sections in 40 countries, an International Secretariat in Geneva, and UN Office in New York. More information can be found at [www.wilpf.org](http://www.wilpf.org). WILPF is also a member of the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.

<sup>2</sup> See the Gender and Radiation Impact Project for more details: [www.genderandradiation.org](http://www.genderandradiation.org).

<sup>3</sup> See for example Dr. Barbara Rose Johnston, “Nuclear weapons tests, fallout, and the devastating impact on Marshall Islands environment, health, and human rights,” and Ray Acheson, “Wider consequences—impact on development,” in *Unspeakable suffering: the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons*, WILPF, 2013, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/Unspeakable/Unspeakable.pdf>; and *Gender, development, and nuclear weapons*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and International Law and Policy Institute, 2016, <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/gender-development-and-nuclear-weapons-en-659.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> See *Gender, development, and nuclear weapons*, *op. cit.*

3. Mainstream nuclear weapon discourse is saturated in imagery and culture dominated by hegemonic heteronormative masculinity. The language and depiction of nuclear weapons as phallic objects<sup>5</sup> is just one part of the larger understanding of nuclear weapons as affording an aggressiveness as well as an invulnerability, invincibility, and impregnability of states that possess them. The concept of state security being guaranteed through the deployment, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons is highly gendered; it is based on a hegemonic concept of masculinity in which the state acts as a protector to its feminised, protected civilians. Nuclear weapon possession is the pinnacle of this understanding of the state, and of the need to pursue security through violence and weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.
4. Disarmament, in particular the elimination of nuclear weapons, is seen in this context as being “irrational,” “imprudent,” and indeed, “feminine”—the arguments used by representatives of nuclear-armed states against TPNW supporters are that they are being “emotional,” that they do not truly understand security, or do not really have security interests—certainly not of the standards that the “big boys” of the nuclear-armed club have.<sup>6</sup>
5. Nuclear weapons are a tool of patriarchy. The concept of nuclear deterrence is designed to justify spending billions of dollars on weapons that risk the world’s total destruction in order to maintain power and privilege. Those espousing the theory of deterrence have managed to maintain their dominance over the nuclear weapon debate by employing the tools of the patriarchy, such as gaslighting and victim blaming. They argue that other countries make them feel insecure and thus they need nuclear weapons to maintain order and stability. But the order maintained by nuclear weapons is a fundamentally unequal order, ruled by threat of massive violence.<sup>7</sup>

Iceland, as a leader in gender equality and justice and as a country committed to multilateralism and cooperation, should join the majority of states in the world that have supported the TPNW. By signing and ratifying the TPNW, Iceland would be rejecting the masculinised concepts of security and nuclear weapons that have henceforth dominated mainstream discourse and debates on the topic. Joining the Treaty would provide an opportunity for Iceland to articulate a different understanding of how security is manifested, through the pursuit of disarmament, peace, sustainable development, environmental protection, gender justice, and economic equality.

Under the TPNW, Iceland would be committed not to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party” under the TPNW. In practice, such a commitment would oblige Iceland not to act in a manner that could be seen to support the possession or use of nuclear weapons. Iceland would thus have to decline to support any

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<sup>5</sup> See for example Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12:4 (Summer 1987).

<sup>6</sup> See for example Ray Acheson, “The nuclear ban and the patriarchy: a feminist analysis of opposition to prohibiting nuclear weapons,” *Critical Studies on Security*, 30 April 2018.

<sup>7</sup> See for example Ray Acheson, “A feminist critique of the atomic bomb,” Heinrich Stiftung Boell, 12 October 2018, <https://www.boell.de/en/2018/10/12/feminist-critique-atomic-bomb>.

language in future North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) strategic concepts that endorsed activities prohibited by the TPNW, such as nuclear deterrence, nuclear sharing, or the potential use of nuclear weapons. This would be consistent with a position that security is not based on the slaughter of civilians but on multilateral engagement and peaceful solutions to conflict.

As a party to the TPNW, Iceland would be in a stronger position to work with other members of the international community to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A refusal to join the TPNW and engage with its processes would cast serious doubt on Iceland's commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world and could be seen as tacit support for a new and dangerous nuclear arms race. At a time of great global tension, when nuclear-armed states are modernising their arsenals and threatening to use their nuclear weapons, it is all the more important for countries such as Iceland to declare their unequivocal opposition to nuclear weapons and to help strengthen international norms against them.

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